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Abstract 
This paper reports on the development and verification of a novel formal symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) for verifying the 
reliability and security of Ethereum smart contracts, denoted as FSPVM-E, in Coq proof assistant. It adopts execution-verification 
isomorphism (EVI), an extension of Curry-Howard isomorphism (CHI), as its fundamental theoretical framework. The current version of 
FSPVM-E is constructed on a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) framework, an extensible and universal formal 
intermediate programming language Lolisa, which is a large subset of the Solidity programming language using generalized algebraic 
datatypes, and the corresponding formally verified interpreter of Lolisa, denoted as FEther. It supports the ERC20 standard and can 
automatically simultaneously symbolically execute the smart contract programs of Ethereum and verify their reliability and security 
properties using Hoare logic in Coq. In addition, this work, contributes to solving the problems of automation, inconsistency and 
reusability in higher-order logic theorem proving. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, with the development of computer science, a number of software programs have been deployed in many 
critical domains. The smart contract program of blockchain technology [1] is one notable example of critical software. A 
smart contract is a kind of digital contract where the code is the law. However, this feature of smart contracts makes them 
susceptible to attack that can result in economic loss. Therefore, verifying the reliability and security of such programs in 
the most rigorous manner available is crucial. Higher-order logic theorem proving (HOLTP) is one of the most rigorous 
technologies for verifying the reliability and security of programs to build trustworthy software systems. However, in 
applying HOLTP, it is necessary to abstract a specific formal model for the target software system manually, with the help 
of proof assistants [3]. Although this type of formal verification technology has many advantages, such as providing 
sufficient flexibility in designing formal models, abstracting and expressing very complex systems, the formal models are 
dependent on the experience, knowledge, and proficiency of the users. Thus, the standard approaches have a low-level of 
automation, are prone to inconsistencies and have a low-level of reusability, which presents a barrier to the extensive 
application of HOLTP. 
 
One possible solution for addressing these problems is to design an extensible and universal formal symbolic process 
virtual machine (FSPVM) like KLEE [6], but developed in a HOLTP system, which can symbolically execute real world 
programs and verify their properties automatically using the results of the execution. 
 
This paper gives a high-level overview of our current research, highlighting two contributions. First, we present a novel 
extension of Curry-Howard isomorphism (CHI) [7], denoted as execution-verification isomorphism (EVI) [4] which 
integrates the advantages of model checking and theorem proving technology. EVI is the basic theory for combining higher-
order logic systems (HOLS), supporting CHI, and symbolic execution technology to extend and virtualize HOLS as an 
FSPVM to solve the problems of automation, consistency and reusability in higher-order logic theorem proving. Second, we 
take EVI as the fundamental theoretical framework to develop an FSPVM for Ethereum (FSPVM-E) including a general, 
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extensible and reusable formal memory framework called GERM, an extensible and universal formal intermediate 
programming language, denoted as Lolisa (the present version is a large subset of the Solidity programming language), 
which automates generalized algebraic datatypes, and the corresponding formally verified interpreter of Lolisa, denoted as 
FEther. The FSPVM-E is entirely developed in Coq [8], which is one of the best higher-order logic theorem proving 
assistants, based on the Calculus of inductive construction (Cic) that supports CHI. The FSPVM-E is employed to 
automatically complete the formal verification of the security and reliability properties of Ethereum smart contract programs. 
To our knowledge, our work is the first to automatically validate the formal syntax and semantics of the Solidity 
programming language, and systematically build a virtual execution and verification environment entirely in Coq for 
automatically verifying Ethereum smart contracts, solving the problem of inconsistency. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related work on consistency, reusability and 
automation as well as formal verification for Ethereum smart contracts. Section 3 briefly illustrates the basic concepts and 
advantages of EVI. Section 4 describes the overall implementation of FSPVM-E and simple cases of its application. Finally, 
Section 5 presents preliminary conclusions and directions for future work. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Program verification using higher-order logic theorem proving is a very important theoretical field in computer science. 
Many researchers have addressed the problems of consistency, reusability, and automation from various aspects and have 
developed new tools to contribute to this field. For the problems of consistency and reusability, one well-known and 
efficient method is to formalize real world programming languages in an intermediate programming language (IPL) and 
design a formal memory model as the state model. Since the late 1960’s, many studies have focused on building memory 
models mathematically for program verification. One of the milestones was the CompCert project on compiler verification 
in 2008 [9]. The team of CompCert formalized an equivalent IPL called Clight for the C programming language using Coq. 
They also developed a formal memory model for low-level imperative languages such as C and compiler intermediate 
languages. These works have served as the basis for some interesting and powerful program verification and analysis 
frameworks. Verified software toolchain (VST) [10] and deep specifications [11] are two representative projects that have 
been developed in conjunction with the IPL and formal memory model provided by CompCert. However, these works have 
focused on specific domains and programming languages, and their formal memory models are deeply embedded in their 
framework, making it difficult to extend and modify them for supporting different high-level specifications, which would 
enable the formalization of programs written in different high-level languages. Also, most of them are focused on a subset 
of problems in consistency, reusability, or automation instead of considering them all simultaneously. Furthermore, it 
requires expert knowledge to rebuild the source code of the programs and construct the abstract layers manually. Hence, 
there is still a risk of inconsistency and it is not possible to fully utilize automated theorem proving technologies. 
 
Meanwhile, formal verification for blockchain technology has become a subject of particular interest in recent years and 
many prominent research works have focused on the formal verification of the bytecode of the Ethereum virtual machine 
(EVM). For example, KEVM [12] is a formal semantics for the EVM written using the K-framework, like the formalization 
conducted in Lem [13]. However, the development of a high-level formal specification for Solidity and relevant formal 
verification tools have attracted considerably less interest from researchers despite its importance for programming and 
debugging smart contract software. Our present study fills this gap. 
 
3. EVI 
 
The concept of EVI is applied here to increase the degree to which the process of program verification is conducted 
automatically by combining HOLTP and symbolic execution. EVI is the abstract fundamental theoretical framework for 
extending and virtualizing a higher-order logic formal system, supporting CHI to become a universal and extensible formal 
symbolic process virtual machine, which addresses the consistency, reusability and automation problems of HOLTP 
simultaneously. The basic concept of EVI and its main features will be briefly introduced in following subsections, while 
further details can be found in our other work [4]. 
 
3.1. Conceptual basis of EVI  
 
EVI has two core elements. The first is the theoretical basis of extending a formal logic system which supports CHI theory 
as a virtual formal symbolic execution environment. The second is the isomorphism between symbolic execution and formal 
verification of HOLTP. 
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Proof assistants are a kind of specialized software, which provide an environment for developing mathematical 
constructs. In this environment, programmers can use the vernacular to define mathematical objects and finally write proofs. 
They are evaluated by the trusted core of the proof assistant which generates the logic results. Hence, compared with the 
architecture of a PVM, they provide a fundamental virtual environment, and we can extend HOLTP assistants, like Coq, as a 
special FSPVM, which contains the minimal full virtualization environment that can symbolically execute programs written 
in a high-level general-purpose programming language ℒ. 
 
 
Figure 1. Overall architecture of FSPVM in Coq 
 
Specifically, we take Coq as an example because Coq is one of the best proof assistants whose basic theory Cic supports 
CHI. As Rule 1, the logic environment ℰ of Coq can be viewed as the abstraction or virtualization of the real world physical 
operating environment, which provides a functional programming language (FPL) called Gallina. 
 
 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠
→       𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (1) 
 
This virtual environment includes two sub-environments: a functional-programming environment and a proof editing 
environment [14], which are used to define formal functions and proof obligations. In Rules 2 and 3, Gallina plays the role 
of low-level machine code in this ℰ and the trusted core of Coq (TCOC) can be seen as the virtualization of the CPU, which 
can evaluate (be isomorphic to proving) the programs, also called proof terms, written in Gallina. 
 
 𝐶𝑃𝑈
𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠
→       𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐶 (2) 
 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠
→       𝐺𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎 (3) 
 
However, this fundamental environment provided by Coq is not sufficient to symbolically execute ℒ , because the 
TCOC only has two functions, evaluating and proving, so it cannot parse and execute a real-world program (RWprogram) 
written in ℒ. Therefore, it must be extended. As in the blueprint given in our paper [4], if we want to extend Coq to become 
an FSPVM that can symbolically execute and verify real world programs, in addition to the fundamental logic environment 
of Gallina and TCOC, we need to construct three more key elements: a formal general memory model (FMemory), a high-
level formal intermediate language ℱℒ , which is equivalent to ℒ , for rewriting the formal version of RWprogram as 
FRWprogram, and the respective formally verified interpreter (FInterpreter). As illustrated in Rules 4 and 5, the FMemory 
simulates the real-world physical memory space and operations, while the ℱℒ is the equivalent formal version of ℒ, which 
can be analyzed in ℰ directly. 
Memory CPU I/O Devices
Hardware
Symbolic Process Virtual Machine
Coq
execute
Coq Trusted Core
Formal Memory Model 
Formal High-level Language
formalizeverify
modify 𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
execute
(verify) result
symbolically execute
Formal Virtual Machine
Operating system
…
virtualize
Symbolic Virtualizing Software
Application Process
equivalently transform
transparent
Formal Verified Interpreter Theorems
4 Zheng Yang, Hang Lei 
 
 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦
𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠
→       𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (4) 
 (ℒ
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠
→        ℱℒ)  ∧ (ℒ ≡ ℱℒ) ⊃ 𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 ≡ 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 (5) 
 
The real-world program RWprogram written in ℒ can be executed directly with the help of corresponding interpreters 
in a physical operating environment. Compared with the physical operating environment, the combination of FMemory and  
ℰ has already been virtualized in a minimal higher-order logic operating environment. Therefore, although a FRWprogram 
rewritten in the ℱℒ cannot be executed directly in an ℰ, such as Coq, we can implement an FInterpreter using FPL based on 
the higher-order logic operating environment that follows the formal syntax and semantics of the corresponding ℱℒ to 
simulate the execution process of the RWprogram in the real world and interpret the FRWprogram so that it can be 
symbolically executed in ℰ directly with the same process as is conducted in the real world. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Equivalence between real world program (RWprogram) execution and execution in a logic environment 
 
Then, because the FInterpreter is a kind of program written in an FPL, such as Gallina provided by Coq, which 
supports CHI, the evaluation process of FInterpreter with abstract definition as 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟:𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 → 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 
satisfies CHI Rules 6 and 7 [15]. 
 
 propositions as types (6) 
 proofs as evaluation of programs (7) 
 
Meanwhile, as illustrated in Figure 2, when the FInterpreter takes the FRWprogram and the state of FMemory as 
arguments, the evaluation process of the FInterpreter is equivalent to the symbolic execution of the FRWprogram. Hence, 
we have Rule 8 that the proofs are isomorphic with the execution of programs. Then, as Rule 9 and 10, in Coq or similar 
proof assistants, propositions strengthened by special limitations, such as Hoare logic, are the properties for special 
conditions, and the respective proofs are the verifications of properties. 
 
 proofs correspond to evaluation of programs correspond to execution of programs (8) 
 properties correspond to stronger propositions correspond to type (9) 
 proofs correspond to verification (10) 
 
Therefore, we have Rules 11 and 12 which show that program verification in higher-order theorem-proving assistants, 
which support CHI, is isomorphic with symbolic execution in the logic operating environment built using the proof 
assistants. 
 
 properties correspond to stronger propositions (11) 
 execution corresponds to verification (12) 
 
Here, the EVI combines the formal verification of higher-order theorem proving and symbolic execution technology. 
 
3.2. Main features 
 
The proposed FSPVM based on EVI is able to solve the consistency, reusability, and automation problems that are present 
in the standard formal verification approaches of HOLTP. 
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Addressing consistency problems, we note that, according to Rule 12, the execution of FRWprograms written in an ℱℒ 
is isomorphic to their formal verification. Therefore, FRWprograms obviously represent the formal models of the 
corresponding RWprograms. According to Rule 5, RWprogram ≡ FRWprogram . This means the formal model is 
equivalent to the target RWprogram, without any consistency problems. In addition, since ℒ ≡ ℱℒ, the modeling process of 
formalization is standardized as equivalently translating RWprograms into FRWprograms line by line mechanically without 
the need for rebuilding, abstracting, or any other steps that would depend on the experience, knowledge, and proficiency of 
users. Therefore, no consistency problems will be introduced during the construction of the formal models. Furthermore, all 
the elements of the FSPVM are defined in the higher-order logic proof assistants directly, using the FPLs provided by the 
proof assistants. Thus, properties such as reliability, security, and functional correctness, can be certified in the proof 
assistants without any additional process of modelling or abstracting. 
 
For reusability problems, because of the symbolic execution in proof assistants, the execution results are logic 
expressions. Therefore these results can be directly employed to be verified in any theorems. Moreover, the sets of results, 
which have been verified, can be directly applied in other theorem verifications. Besides, as mentioned above, 
FRWprograms are the formal models of corresponding RWprograms, and FRWprograms can be executed for verifying any 
relevant theorems rather than rebuilding the entire formal models. 
 
Automation problems should be considered from two perspectives. In modeling, because FRWprograms are the formal 
models of corresponding RWprograms, the formalization process of building formal models is identical with the process of 
rewriting the RWprograms ℱℒ using mechanically. And this mechanical translation process can be conducted by specific 
translators automatically, and thereby reduce the workload associated with the building of formal models. In verification, as 
mentioned above, formal verification can be conducted automatically by symbolically executing FRWprograms in FSPVM. 
And, obviously, the program verification process of all formal models based on EVI has been unified as the process of 
evaluating FInterpreter (mstate, FRWprogram), and proving the equivalence between the result memory state and the 
excepted final memory state. Thus, the differences between the program verification processes among different formal 
models have been reduced. It then becomes possible to design subtactics based on the tactic mechanism provided by proof 
assistants that can conduct different parts of the verification process, and combine them in a larger tactic. In this manner, the 
verification process can be conducted in a fully automatic fashion by employing a combination of tactics. 
 
4. Overview of FSPVM-E 
 
Taking EVI as the basic theory, a general, extensible, and reusable FSPVM for the formal verification of Ethereum smart 
contracts are built and verified entirely in Coq, denoted as FSPVM-E. And FSPVM-E has already been able to semi-
automatically symbolically execute Ethereum smart contracts written in Solidity and verify the properties about the 
reliability, security and functional correctness simultaneously. 
 
4.1. Architecture 
 
The FSPVM-E framework is implemented entirely in Coq, and the FSPVM of EVI is the fundamental theoretical 
framework for building FSPVM-E. The overall structure of FSPVM-E is strictly following Figure 1 that is constructed by 
three parts. To be specific, the basic element of FSPVM is a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) 
framework that can simultaneously support different formal verification specifications, particularly at the code level. The 
framework simulates physical memory hardware structure, including a low-level formal memory space, and provides a set 
of simple, nonintrusive application programming interfaces and assistant tools using Coq that can support different formal 
verification specifications simultaneously. The proposed GERM framework is independent and customizable, and was 
verified entirely in Coq. The second part is a formal intermediate programming language, denoted as Lolisa, which is a large 
subset of the Solidity programming language mechanized in Coq. And the semantics of Lolisa are based on GERM 
framework. The third part is a formal verified interpreter for Lolisa, called FEther, which connect GERM, Lolisa and TCOC 
together to symbolically execute and verify the smart contracts of Ethereum. These three parts are introduced specifically in 
Subsections 4.2–4.4. 
 
4.2. General formal memory model 
 
In [4], we have developed a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory framework based on higher-order logic using 
Coq, denoted as GERM, and it is served as the basis of FSPVM. To be specific, The GERM framework is designed and 
implemented based on Cic, which is well suited as a basis for arbitrary high-level specifications in different formal models 
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for program verification. Specifically, the GERM framework can be reused with different program verification formal 
models to store and generate intermediate states. 
 
The overall GERM framework structure is illustrated in Fig. 1. According to the figure, the GERM framework 
comprises two main components: a formal memory model in a trusted domain and assistant tools in a general domain. The 
formal memory model includes three levels from bottom to top: a formal memory space, low-level memory management 
operations, and basic memory management APIs. Assistant tools are employed in the GERM framework to obtain user 
requirements and generate dynamic specifications. Particularly, although these assistant tools are implemented in the general 
domain using general-purpose programming languages, the relation between the assistant tools and the respective results 
satisfies the non-aftereffect property, discussed in [4]. As such, the verified results are not influenced by the assistant tools 
implementation. 
 
 
Figure 3. Architecture of the GERM framework 
 
The workflow of the GERM framework can be defined in conjunction with Figure 3 as follows. A user first sets initial 
requirements, such as memory size, and then the assistant tools generate the respective specifications. Next, the entire formal 
memory model is certified according to the correctness properties employed in Coq. In the Coq specification, the judgments 
of the dynamic semantics are encoded as mutually inductive predicates, and the functions are written in Gallina, which is a 
non-Turing complete language that has eliminated halting problems. If the formal memory model satisfies all required 
properties, then the specific GERM framework has been constructed successfully. The user can then build a high-level 
formal model based on the generated GERM framework. The complete workload for constructing the GERM framework 
with 100 memory blocks is about 3000 Coq lines and 100 C++ lines. 
 
4.3. Formal intermediate programming language 
 
The source language of the current version FSPVM, called Lolisa [5], is a large subset of the Solidity [16] programming 
language, comparable to the subsets commonly recommended for writing common smart contracts. Lolisa not only includes 
nearly all the characteristic components of Solidity, such as mapping, modifier, contract, and address types, but it also 
contains general-purpose programming language features, such as multiple return values, pointer arithmetic, struct, field 
access and the full power of functions, including recursive functions and function pointers. The main omissions are floating 
datatype, explicit ether unit of Solidity, the goto statement and non-structured forms of switch such as Duff’s device [17]. 
Particularly, the formal syntax of Lolisa is defined with generalized algebraic datatypes (GADTs) [2] theory, which gives 
imparts static type annotation to all the values and expressions of Lolisa. In this way, Lolisa has a stronger static typing 
judgements system than Solidity for checking the construction of programs. As such, it is impossible to construct ill-typed 
terms in Lolisa. In addition, because the Solidity can equivalently translated into Lolisa directly, the static type-checking 
system also assists in discovering ill-typed terms in Solidity source code. 
 
The semantics of Lolisa is formally defined in natural semantics. Because Lolisa is employed as the equivalent 
intermediate language for Solidity, which should be able to be parsed, executed and verified in Coq or similar proof 
assistants, the semantics of Lolisa are deterministic and base on the GERM framework.  
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Finally, Lolisa has completely mechanized into Coq. To our knowledge, Lolisa is the first mechanized and validated 
formal syntax and semantics developed for Solidity. 
 
4.4. Formal verified interpreter 
 
The last piece of the puzzle for constructing the FSPVM-E for automatically verifying and symbolically executing 
simultaneously is the respective formal verified interpreter of Lolisa, denoted as FEther, which is built on the GERM 
framework and specifications of Lolisa. 
 
 
Figure 4. Architecture of the FEther framework 
 
Specifically, as the architecture of FEther shown in Figure 4, the FEther is constructed by two parts: the parser and 
formal instruction set architecture (ISA). First of all, the parser is employed to analyze the formal abstract syntax of 
FRWprograms line-by-line separate the tokens of the current executing statement. Second, in essence, the ISA is the formal 
computational semantics ℰ𝒮 using denotational semantics, which is strictly equivalent with the inductive semantics 𝒮 of 
Lolisa. And the instruction set ℐ𝓃𝓈 of Lolisa is defined as rule 13. The FEther will be adopted to simultaneously execute and 
derive the FRWprograms state in TCOC. A new intermediate memory state mstate will be generated and returned to the 
formal interpreter as a new minit for the next execution iteration. And the FEther will repeat these process until it is satisfied 
certain conditions, such as the programs stopped normally or breaking off, and output the final memory state mfinal. 
 
 ℐ𝓃𝓈 ≝ ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ℕ. (⋃𝒮𝑖
 
𝑖=0
) ↔ (⋃ℰ𝒮𝑖
 
𝑖=0
) (13) 
 
Another very important feature of FEther is the combination of gas mechanism of Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) and 
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [20]. To be specific, first of all, the combination of symbolic execution and higher-order 
theorem proving facilitates our use of BMC to verify FRWprograms. We employ BMC notion to set a limitation into the 
implementation of FEther that it only can execute K times for avoiding the infinite execution situation. Actually, EVM also 
has the gas mechanism to avoid the same cases in digital transaction. Therefore, the implementation of FEther combines the 
BMC and gas mechanism. And the execution semantics of FEther follows rule 14 and 15, where the context of the formal 
memory space is denoted as 𝑀 , 𝜎  represents the current memory state, the context of the execution environment is 
represented as 𝛺 and ℱ represents the formal system of verification. In addition, the initial environment 𝑒𝑛𝑣, which are 
initialized by the helper function 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣 , and the initial gas value of 𝑒𝑛𝑣  is set by 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠 . These rules represent two 
conditions of Lolisa programs 𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡) execution, denoted as ⇓𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡) . Under the first condition governed by the rule 14, 
⇓𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡) terminates after a finite number of steps, which is under K times limitation. Under the second condition governed by 
the rule 15, ⇓𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡) cannot terminate via its internal logic, and would undergo an infinite number of steps. Therefore, 𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡) 
is deliberately stopped via the gas-limitation-checking mechanism. Here, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠 represents an optional arguments list. The 
total workload of FEther is about 7000 Coq lines. 
 
 
𝛺 ⊢ 𝑒𝑛𝑣        𝛭 ⊢ 𝜎         ℱ ⊢  𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠        𝛺,𝛭,ℱ ⊢  𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)
𝑒𝑛𝑣 = 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠 (𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)))
𝜎 = 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡))
𝛺,𝛭, ℱ ⊢  〈𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, ⇓𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)〉  
𝑒 𝑒 𝑢𝑡𝑒,𝑇
⇒       〈𝜎′, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣〉
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𝛺 ⊢ 𝑒𝑛𝑣        𝛭 ⊢ 𝜎, 𝑏𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟         ℱ ⊢  𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠        𝛺,𝛭, ℱ ⊢  𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)
𝑒𝑛𝑣 = 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠 (𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)))         𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣 = 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡))
𝜎 = 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡))
𝛺,𝛭,ℱ ⊢  〈𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, ⇓𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)〉  
𝑒 𝑒 𝑢𝑡𝑒,∞
⇒       〈𝜎′, 𝑒𝑛𝑣′〉  ∧  𝑒𝑛𝑣′. (𝑔𝑎𝑠) ≤ 𝑔𝑎𝑠𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 
  𝑇
⇒ 〈𝜎′, 𝑒𝑛𝑣′〉
 
(15) 
 
4.5. Case study 
 
To demonstrate the power of our new tool, we have applied our FSPVM-E to specify and verify Smart Sponsor Contract 
(SSC) [19] again in the Coq proof assistant. As shown in Figure 5, FSPVM-E is already can be used to verify Ethereum 
smart contracts. In our past work [18], we have verified 6 key theorems of SSC using standard HOLTP approach, and the 
manual workload is about 1200 Coq lines. Presently, the manual workload of the verification for the same 6 theorems is 
only 283 Coq lines using FSPVM-E. Obviously, FSPVM-E makes the verification process become much more efficiently. 
Besides, we also have employed FSPVM-E to verify a number of complex smart contracts, and the relevant examples have 
been introduced in [5]. In short, the current version of FSPVM-E has already support ERC20 standard, and it is able to 
almost automatically verify the smart contracts which are developed following the standard. 
 
  
Figure 5. Formal memory states during the execution and verification of the Lolisa program 
 
5. Conclusion and future work 
 
In this paper, we briefly introduce a formal symbolic process virtual machine, denoted as FSPVM-E, which is built on our 
present research works, for automatically formalizing and verifying Ethereum smart contracts using HOLTP in Coq. 
Specifically, FSPVM-E is entirely developed in Coq. And FSPVM-E takes execution-verification isomorphism (EVI) as the 
fundamental theoretical framework, the formal memory framework GERM as the low-level memory model, Lolisa as the 
source language and FEther as the virtual execution engine to symbolically execute formal version smart contracts in 
FSPVM-E. Current version of FSPVM-E has already supported the ERC20 standard of Ethereum and can significantly 
improve the proof efficiency compared with the standard higher-order logic theorem proving approaches. 
 
The FSPVM-E experiment described in this paper is still ongoing, and much work remains to be done: certify the 
correctness of FEther; optimize the evaluation and proof efficiency of FSPVM-E; extend Lolisa to support more general-
purpose programming language; extend the specifications of GERM to shared-memory concurrency; etc. However, the 
preliminary results obtained so far provide strong evidence that the initial blueprint of building a verified, general and 
extensible formal symbolic process virtual machine using higher-order logic theorem proving with high-level automation 
and reusability and without inconsistency problem can be achieved. 
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